BRIGHT v. STATE, A-9323 (Alaska App. 3-7-2007)
Court of Appeals No. A-9323.Court of Appeals of Alaska.
March 7, 2007.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Sharon Gleason, Judge, Trial Court No. 3AN-02-5383 CI.
John Ian Arthur Bright, pro se, Seward. Michael Sean McLaughlin, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and David W. Márquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, Andrews, Senior Superior Court Judge[fn*] and Joannides, Superior Court Judge.[fn**] [Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges, not participating].
[fn*] Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a). [fn**] Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
COATS, Chief Judge.Page 2
John Ian Arthur Bright was convicted of first-degree murder[fn1] for killing Robert Pfeil in October 1985. The full details of the plot against Pfeil, and his ultimate murder, are recounted in Bright v.State.[fn2] In sum, Bright conspired with several of his ultimate codefendants to carry out a contract killing on Pfeil. After the murder took place, several of Bright’s codefendants agreed to wear wires in order to capture various incriminating statements Bright ultimately made about his involvement in the murder. These statements, as well as the testimony of other witnesses and numerous pieces of circumstantial and physical evidence, were introduced at trial. A jury convicted Bright of first-degree murder. Bright was sentenced to the maximum 99-year sentence for his part in the murder. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Bright’s conviction.[fn3]
Bright next petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that his appointed trial attorney — Public Defender John Salemi — offered ineffective assistance of counsel before and during trial.[fn4] The trial court denied Bright’s application, and this Court affirmed.[fn5]
After his first application was denied, Bright filed a second application for post-conviction relief, under the authority ofGrinols v. State.[fn6] Bright argues that his post-conviction attorneys were ineffective in representing him in his post-conviction litigation. Proceeding pro se, Bright claims ineffectiveness on the part of his post-conviction counsel, LarryPage 3
S. Cohn and James LaVecchia, as well as all other attorneys that have represented him beginning with his arrest in 1985.
In an extensive written decision, Superior Court Judge Sharon Gleason dismissed Bright’s application.[fn7] We have independently reviewed the record, and affirm for the reasons stated in Judge Gleason’s decision.
[fn1] AS 11.41.100(a)(1). [fn2] 826 P.2d 765, 767-69 (Alaska App. 1992). [fn3] 826 P.2d at 775. [fn4] Bright v. State, Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 4341 at 2 (Jan. 17, 2001), 2001 WL 43400 at *1. [fn5] Id. at 11, 2001 WL 43400 at *5. [fn6] 10 P.3d 600, 618 (Alaska App. 2000), aff’d in part, 74 P.3d 889(Alaska 2003). [fn7] While Judge Gleason’s order is entitled “Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Part Four of Second Post-Conviction Relief Application,” this order in fact disposes of all of the claims which Bright made in his four-part application for post-conviction relief before the superior court.Page 1