ADAMS v. STATE, A-8797 (Alaska App. 6-28-2006)
Court of Appeals No. A-8797.Court of Appeals of Alaska.
June 28, 2006.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Larry D. Card, Judge, Trial Court No. 3AN-02-10394 CR.
David D. Reineke, Assistant Public Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Douglas H. Kossler, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and David W. Márquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION. AND JUDGMENT
STEWART, Judge.
John Mikel Adams drove his car at high speed through a stop sign and into the side of an Anchorage Police patrol car driven by Officer Philip Kantor. For this misconduct, a jury convicted Adams of third-degree assault for recklessly placing Officer Kantor in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument, a vehicle.[fn1]
Adams argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that fair-minded jurors could find that the State had proved Adams guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.[fn2] Accordingly, we affirm Adams’s conviction.
On November 11, 2002, at about 2:30 in the afternoon, Adams was driving with a friend in downtown Anchorage. Adams collided with another vehicle driven by Mina Jacobs. Jacobs testified that Adams’s vehicle struck her as she was proceeding through an intersection with the green light. Adams initially stopped, but he drove away as Jacobs was getting out of her vehicle. Jacobs followed Adams and got his license plate number, but it was apparent to her that he was not going to stop. She stopped and called the police.
Police dispatch broadcast a report to be on the lookout for a brown station wagon. Officer Kantor responded to the report and was on 13th Avenue approaching the intersection with Denali while Adams was approaching the same intersection on Denali. As Officer Kantor drove into the intersection, he saw Adams’s vehicle, the brown station wagon, approaching the intersection at a high rate of speed. Officer Kantor concluded that the driver had “no intention of stopping.”
The road conditions were icy. The speed limit in the area was 25 miles per hour. Officer Kantor estimated that Adams was traveling close to 40 miles per hour before the collision. Officer Kantor testified that he thought “this is going to hurt,” even while he tried to avoid the collision.
Adams’s vehicle hit the passenger doors on the right side of Officer Kantor’s patrol car. The force of the collision spun Kantor’s patrol car into a concrete pole barrier at the corner of the intersection, damaging the left side of the patrol car. Because of the damage from the collision, Kantor was unable to open the driver’s door of the patrol car. The patrol car was totaled.
Officer Kantor suffered pain in his lower legs and knee but testified that he “wasn’t hurt bad.” Adams’s passenger suffered a bloody nose from hitting his head on the dashboard.
After the accident, Adams claimed that his brakes had malfunctioned.
Adams was charged with one count of third-degree assault,[fn3] one count of leaving the scene of the accident with Jacobs,[fn4] and one count of failure to carry proof of insurance.[fn5] At trial, Adams claimed that his collision with Officer Kantor was caused by brake failure, and he did not have the required mental state of recklessness for third-degree assault. Adams was convicted of all three charges.
Adams appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the third-degree assault charge.
Under AS 11.41.220(a), “[a] person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if that person recklessly places another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument. . . .” Adams argues that there was insufficient evidence at trial to establish that Officer Kantor was placed in fear of imminent “serious physical injury” or that Adams acted “recklessly.”
When we review a claim of insufficient evidence, we view the evidence presented at trial, and the reasonable inferences arising from the evidence, in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict.[fn6] Viewing the evidence in this manner, we decide whether a fair-minded juror exercising reasonable judgment could conclude that the State met its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.[fn7]
AS 11.81.900(b)(56) defines serious physical injury, in part, as “physical injury caused by an act performed under circumstances that create a substantial risk of death. . . .”
The evidence showed that Adams, while fleeing the scene of an accident, drove his car substantially over the speed limit on icy roads in a residential area of Anchorage, without regard for a stop sign, and crashed into the side of Officer Kantor’s patrol car, spinning the patrol car into a concrete pole at the corner of the intersection. The patrol car was totaled, and Officer Kantor was injured. From the evidence presented at trial, a juror could reasonably find that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Kantor was placed in fear of imminent serious physical injury, and that Adams used his vehicle as a dangerous instrument by driving the station wagon in a manner that created a substantial risk of death.
Adams also argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that he acted recklessly within the definition of third-degree assault. Under AS 11.81.900(a)(3), a person acts “recklessly” when the person is “aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the [statutorily prohibited] result will occur. . . .” Adams argues he did not act recklessly because he was not aware his brakes would fail at the moment they did, and, therefore, it was impossible for him to consciously disregard the risk that his brakes would fail. But this argument requires us to view the evidence in a light favorable to Adams because there was conflicting evidence on the status of the brakes on Adams’s station wagon. The State argued that Adams was reckless because, while speeding away from another collision just minutes before, he drove through the stop sign into the intersection without regard for the potential that there would be crossing traffic that he could not avoid.
There is evidence in the record supporting this view of Adams’s recklessness. We conclude that a reasonable juror could find that the State met its burden of proving the mental element of recklessness. Therefore, we reject Adams’s arguments.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
[fn1] AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A). [fn2] See Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981);Deal v. State, 657 P.2d 404, 405 (Alaska App. 1983). [fn3] AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A). [fn4] AS 28.35.050(a). [fn5] AS 28.22.019. [fn6] See Silvernail v. State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Alaska App. 1989). [fn7] Id.; Dorman, 622 P.2d at 453.